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I. INTRODUCTION
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation'I This simple declaration has been severely convoluted in the
United States Supreme Court's struggle to develop a logical analysis of the
ever-changing arena ofproperty law. Ilustrative of the Supreme Court's latest
constitutional property law debate is the controversy surrounding the Interest
On Lawyer's Trust Account (IOLTA) Programs. The American Bar
Association (ABA) defines IOLTA as an "innovative finding source."2 It is
a simple definition, but right on the money. More specifically, IOLTA is the
brain child of federal banking regulations.3 In 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 1832
provided a legal basis for IOLTA programs. IOLTA programs fund legal
services for the poor by authorizing attorneys to pool together modest interest
accruals from client funds that are too nominal or in trust too briefly to earn net
interest. Without IOLTA, interest accruals from these fRnds would remain
with the bank, creating a windfall for the bank. Thus, IOLTA achieves the
same objectives of the fabled hero Robin Hood because it takes money out of
the hands ofthe bank and gives it to the poor. Better yet, it does so at no cost
to the client Without the program no net interest would accrue.
Despite IOLTA's philanthropic purpose, plaintiffs in Washington are
challenging as an unconstitutional taking the Washington IOLTA program in
Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington, which
will be decided by the United States Supreme Court in the upcoming term.
IOLTA's opponents contend the automatic transfer of interest to IOLTA is
unconstitutional and should be terminated. The plaintiffs, represented by the
Copyright 2003, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* The Board of Editors of the Louisiana Law Review accepted this article for
publication before the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision sustaining
the IOLTA program. In light of the Court's rationale, without economic damage
there is no taking, the title of the piece, "Much Ado About Nothing," is certainly
prescient.
1. U.S. Const. amend. V.
2. American Bar Association network, What is IOLTA?, available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/iolta/ioltback.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2002) (providing that "a depositary institution is
authorized to permit the owner of a deposit or account on which interest or
dividends are paid to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instruments
for the purpose of making transfers to third parties," but only "with respect to
deposits or accounts which consist solely of funds in which the entire beneficial
interest is held by one or more individuals or by an organization which is operated
primarily for religious, philanthropic, charitable, educational, political, or other
similar purposes and which is not operated for profit...").
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Washington Legal Foundation,4 argue that though they realize no net interest,
the interest is their property nonetheless. Though the validity of lOLTA was
hotly debated in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,5 the Supreme
Court only held that the interest in IOLTA was property, refusing to decide
whether the program effected an unconstitutional taking. Thus, the battle over
IOLTA continues.
Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington
requires the Court to answer the question it escaped in Phillips - whether
IOLTA is an unconstitutional taking To determine IOLTA's
constitutionality, the court must first decide whether to apply aper se test,
generally reserved for physical takings, or a multi-factor test, generally applied
to regulatory takings. The Court has already cut a path for analyzing
regulatory takings in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City ofNew York by
establishing a multi-factor test As this paper will demonstrate, the Court must
now apply the Penn Central test to pave the way toward a logical analysis of
takings of intangible property (i.e., the interest at stake in IOLTA). Washington
Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington provides the Court with
the perfect opportunity to establish, once and for all, the proper analysis for
assessing takings of intangible property, such as the interest at issue in the
constitutional challenge against IOLTA.
The Court's failure to clearly assert the proper standard for analyzing
takings of intangible property such as interest or money, as opposed to real
property such as land or a building, has unnecessarily clouded the
controversy. IOLTA is not a regulatory taking, but it is not a physical taldng
either. Physical takings have generally been restricted to takings of real
property, whereas regulatory takings have been restricted to takings of rights
incidental to real property.7 The interest placed in IOLTA falls within neither
category.
4. The reader is advised to be wary of the distinction between the Washington
Legal Foundation and the Legal Foundation of Washington. The Washington Legal
Foundation is a public interest group representing the plaintiffs, whereas the Legal
Foundation of Washington is an entity the Washington Supreme Court established
to implement the IOLTA program.
5. 524 U.S. 156, 118 S.Ct. 1925 (1998).
6. 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (1978).
7. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 324-25, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 1479 (2002), wherein the Court stated:
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for public
use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the
other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as
controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a
"regulatory taking," and vice versa. For the same reason that we do not
ask whether a physical appropriation advances a substantial government
interest or whether it deprives the owner of all economically valuable use,
we do not apply our precedent from the physical takings context to
regulatory takings claims.
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Nevertheless, as this paper will show, the fungible nature of
interest requires an ad hoc consideration such as that which is
normally applied to regulatory takings. All pertinent factors must be
considered before a government program may be deemed to effect an
unconstitutional taking. Interest should not be analyzed under the test
used for physical takings, for such a test simply does not fit the fluid
nature of interest. An ad hoc consideration of the facts reveals that
IOLTA cannot be considered an unconstitutional taking. Efficiency
and justice, the purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause,8
cannot be achieved if government may not transfer meager amounts
of interest to a program that benefits the public good without
adversely affecting the client.9
Part II, Section A sets forth the facts of Washington Legal
Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington. Part II, Section B
analyzes the history and mechanics of the IOLTA program. Lastly,
Part II, Section C summarizes the essence of the constitutional
dilemma over IOLTA and the importance of Washington Legal
Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington. Part ll discusses
scholarly interpretations of the Takings Clause by analyzing the
theories of two nationally renowned constitutional law scholars, Frank
Michelman and Richard Epstein, as well as the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Takings Clause as revealed byjurisprudence. Part
IV, Section A addresses Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,
wherein the Supreme Court first considered IOLTA and held the
interest at issue was property. Finally, Part IV, Section B picks up
where the Phillips Court left off and analyzes the constitutionality of
IOLTA. This section argues that an ad hoc analysis, rather than aper
se analysis, is the proper takings analysis for IOLTA. If the Court uses
an ad hoc analysis, it should conclude that IOLTA does not effect a
taking. However, even if the Court applies a per se analysis and
concludes that IOLTA does effect a taking, it should ultimately decide
that the proper compensation due is nil. Thus, regardless of the route
it chooses to take, in deciding Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal
Foundation of Washington, the Court should ultimately determine that
IOLTA is a constitutional exercise of government power that does not
require compensation.
8. See generally Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and
Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 997 (1999); Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, andFairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation "Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967).
9. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 343 S.Ct. 158, 159
(1922) ("Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law.").
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II. WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION V. LEGAL FOUNDATION OF
WASHINGTON
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1984, the Washington Supreme Court included an IOLTA program
in its Rules of Professional Conduct. ° The Washington Supreme Court
established the Legal Foundation of Washington in tandem with the
IOLTA program to implement a grant application process by which
IOLTA funds would be distributed. Washington Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.14 requires lawyers to place "client funds that are nominal in
amount or expected to be held for a short period of time" in a pooled
interest-bearing trust account if the attorney determines that the funds
cannot be used to obtain a net return for the client.'" The interest from this
pooled account is paid to the Legal Foundation of Washington, a
charitable organization dedicated to improving the availability and quality
of legal representation for the poor. Under Washington's program, the
client's attorney is given the sole discretion, unfettered by a need for client
consent, to determine whether the client's principal can be managed in a
way that will earn the client a positive net return.' 3 In making this
determination, the lawyer should consider the potential interest accrual of
the funds for the anticipated length of deposit, the cost of maintaining the
account including any attorney or tax reporting costs, and the ability of
the financial institutions to both calculate and allocate the interest to
individual Clients. 14
In this case, four individuals who claimed their interest had been
"taken" by IOLTA along with the Washington Legal Foundation, a public
interest advocacy group, filed suit to challenge the program as an
unconstitutional taking. The district court granted summary judgment for
the Legal Foundation of Washington, holding no property right was at
stake. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held the
appellants owned the interest, reasoning that IOLTA effected a per se
taking that required compensation. 5 On rehearing en banc the Ninth
Circuit reached a different conclusion and affirmed the district court
ruling on the takings issue. 6 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 7
10. See Wash. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.14 (2002).
11. Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Washington, 271 F.3d 835,
844 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2001).
12. Wash. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R 1.14 (c)(2), (c)(3) (2002).
13. Wash. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.14 (c)(3) (2002).
14. Id.
15. Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Washington, 236 F.3d 1097
(9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2001).
16. Washington, 271 F.3d 835.
17. Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 122 S.Ct. 2355 (2002).
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B. The IOLTA Program
The Washington IOLTA program mirrors similar programs
instituted in every other state. Washington's IOLTA program, like all
others, transfers interest accruals, which would otherwise go to the
bank, to programs that help provide legal assistance for indigents.
These programs have essentially the same structure because they were
developed as a result of the Consumer Checking Account Equity Act,
passed in 1980.18 Prior to the Act's enactment, federal law prohibited
federally insured banks from paying interest on checking accounts,
which left attorneys with no other option but to place client monies in
these accounts if they wanted to ensure availability of funds on
demand. 9 The Act, codified in 12 U.S.C. § 1832, authorized federally
insured banks to pay interest on demand accounts, called Negotiable
Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts, but only to a select few. Such
accounts are only available for deposits consisting of funds "held by"
charitable, philanthropic, educational or other non-profit
organizations. 20 However, this requirement does not mean that only
charitable organizations have access to NOW accounts. The Federal
Reserve Board interprets § 1832(a) to allow corporate funds to be
placed in NOW accounts if done pursuant to a program that entitles
charitable organizations to all interest accruals." IOLTA programs fall
within this class.
Congress's timing in passing the Consumer Checking Account
Equity Act was perfect because it allowed states to capitalize on the
soaring interest rates of the 70's by using interest from NOW accounts
to meet their funding needs for programs providing legal aid to
indigents.22 From 1974 to 1981, Legal Services Corporation, a
federally funded corporation, had steadily been subsidizing local
attorneys who provided legal services for the poor, but Congress
drastically reduced the program's budget in 1981, leaving the states
and their bar associations to look for funding elsewhere.2' Thus,
IOLTA was born.
18. Washington, 271 F.3d at 842.
19. Id.
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1832 (a)(2) (2002).
21. Letter from Federal Reserve Board General Counsel Michael Bradfield to
Donald Middlebrooks (Oct. 15, 1981), reprinted in Donald M. Middlebrooks, The
Interest on Trust Accounts Program: Mechanics of its Operation, 56 Fla. B.J. 115,
117 (Feb. 1982).
22. Washington, 271 F.3d at 843.
23. See James D. Anderson, The Future of IOLTA: Solutions to Fifth
Amendment Takings Challenges Against IOLTA Programs, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev.
717, 720.
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Florida instituted the first IOLTA program in 1981 "4 Now there
are IOLTA programs in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.25
Common to all these states is the adoption of the classic canon of legal
professionalism that attorneys are obligated to represent the poor.26 In
fact, Rule 6.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility
encourages attorneys to render at least fifty hours of legal
serviceswithout fee or expectation of fee to persons with limited
means. All attorneys are expected to fulfill this responsibility at
some point in their career. IOLTA helps attorneys fulfill this ethical
obligation without imposing additional costs on attorneys or their
clients because, like Robin Hood, IOLTA confers this benefit on the
poor by taking it from the bank.
Not all concede that IOLTA's goal is a noble one. This school of
thought is embodied in plaintiffs who are waging wars against IOLTA
across the United States.28 IOLTA's opponents attack the program's
merits and allege it gives money to attorneys instead of the poor by
funding controversial causes such as support groups for attorneys with
chemical dependancies.29 While these are valid concerns, they are
concerns best left to the individual states, not the United States
Supreme Court.3" Each state implements its own form of IOLTA and
allocates the monies according to its needs. States, by design, serve as
representatives of their citizens and, consequently, are the appropriate
authority for complaints about the specifics.3
Despite the opposition, IOLTA is an effective program active in
the fifty states and the District of Columbia.32 In 2002, IOLTA
produced approximately one hundred forty-eight million dollars to
help resolve everyday disputes such as spousal and child abuse,
domestic relations, child support, and consumer and housing
24. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 161, 118 S.Ct. at 1929
25. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 159, 118 S.Ct. at 1927-28, n.1; Ind. Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R. 1.15(d) (2000) (establishing an IOLTA program in Indiana after the
Court decided Phillips).
26. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Canon 2 (2002) ("A lawyer should
assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available.").
27. Model Rules of Prof'l Responsibility R. 6.1 (2002) ("A lawyer should
aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year.").
28. See generally Phillips, 524 U.S. 156, 118 S.Ct. 1925; Washington Legal
Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993); Cone v. State
Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11 th Cir. 1987).
29. Cassandra C. Moore, The IOLTA Program: The Invisible Hand, The
CATO Review of Business & Government, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regvl5n3/regl5n3-moore.html (last visited
Apr. 1, 2003).
30. See generally The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison).
31. Id.
32. See supra note 28.
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problems.3 This is a phenomenal amount, considering that had the
interests not been pooled in IOLTA, nothing would have been
generated except a windfall for the bank. Imagine the consequences
of this beneficial program screeching to a halt at the hands of the
Supreme Court with nothing to fill the void.
C. The Essence of the Dilemma
The constitutionality of IOLTA has lurched back and forth in
courts across the country, resulting in a myriad of inconsistencies.34
In Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice
Foundation,35 the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
contradicted every other circuit in the country36 when it held that the
interest earned on funds placed in IOLTA was property. The Supreme
Court resolved the circuit split by affirming the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,37 but the Supreme
Court's refusal to answer the takings issue created another split in the
circuits on the issue of whether IOLTA effects an unconstitutional
taking. The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, using aper
se method of takings analysis, has held IOLTA to be an
unconstitutional taking,38 whereas the Ninth Circuit, applying an ad
hoc analysis, has upheld IOLTA's constitutionality. 9  Thus,
Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington
provides the Supreme Court with the perfect opportunity to resolve
this dispute among the circuits. The Court must, once again, wade
33. See Washington, 271 F.3d at 843.
34. See generally Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice
Found., 873 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (granting summary judgment to
defendants), affld in part, rev'd in part, 94 F.3d. 996 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing
summary judgment to defendants), cert. grantedsub nom; Phillips, 521 U.S. 1117,
117 S.Ct. 2535 (1997), andaffd, 524U.S. 156, 118 S.Ct. 1925 (1998) (holding the
client's interest was "property," but declining to answer whether IOLTA effected
an unconstitutional taking); Washington, 236 F.3d. 1097 (holding that IOLTA
effected an unconstitutional taking), rev'd enbanc, 271 F.3d 835 (holding IOLTA
was not a Fifth Amendment taking, and even if it were, no just compensation was
due); Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962
(holding IOLTA was not an unconstitutional taking).
35. 94 F.3d996.
36. See generally Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993
F.2d 962; Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002; Carroll v. State Bar of
California, 213 Cal.Rptr. 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); In re Lawyers' Trust Accounts,
672 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983); In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n., 332 N.W.2d 151
(Minn. 1982).
37. 524 U.S. 156, 118 S.Ct. 1925.
38. See Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 270
F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 2001).
39. See Washington., 271 F.3d 835.
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through the troubled waters of constitutional property law to
determine the proper analysis for adjudging whether there is an
unconstitutional taking of intangible property. IOLTA's future lies
precariously in the hands of the Court.
II. RESOLVING TH-E CONFLICT BETWEEN IOLTA AND THE
TAKINGS CLAUSE
A. The Enigma of Property Law and Takings Jurisprudence
Property has held an elevated position on the constitutional
hierarchy since our Nation's inception. Unlike many other
constitutional amendments, the Fifth Amendment was included in
the United States Constitution virtually without debate.' Ironically,
unanimity in 1798 has spawned much controversy in subsequent
years as real life dilemmas demand that the scope of property be
defined for purposes of the Fifth Amendment takings analysis. Thus,
the Supreme Court is left with the responsibility of determining what
the law is on constitutional property. Unfortunately, the Court has
been unable to develop an absolute formula because the dimensions
of property are constantly evolving.
1. Constitutional Scholars and the Takings Clause
There is much debate among the scholars regarding the proper
theory to apply in a takings analysis; this paper will focus on two
influential theories: the utilitarian approach of Professor Frank
Michelman, 41 associated with the ad hoc takings analysis, and the
conceptual severance theory of Professor Richard Epstein,
associated with theperse takings test. Michelman argues that before
government can be required to compensate an individual for a takini
the court must determine whether fairness requires compensation.
Richard Epstein, on the other hand, insists that government must
compensate an individual for the taking of any property right."
These differences in theory culminate into the consideration of what
one considers to be the property interest at stake-the bundle of
40. David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings 14 (Foundation
Press 2002).
41. Constitutional law scholar and the.Robert Walmsley Professor at Harvard
Law School.
42. Constitutional law scholar and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service
Professor at the University of Chicago Law School.
43. See generally Michelman, supra note 8 at 1173.
44. Courtney C. Tedrowe, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal
Circuit, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 586, 593 (2000).
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sticks taken as a whole, or each individual stick as a separate piece
of property.
Ownership ofproperty has long been associated with ownership of
a "bundle of rights" or a "bundle of sticks."'45 This metaphor stands for
the proposition that property is what a layperson assumes is incident
to ownership. Following this rationale, the sticks that make up the
bundle are understood to be the rights of use, exclusion and
disposition.46 Though the metaphor of property as a bundle of sticks
is helpful on a theoretical level, it provides little guidance in
determining whether an unconstitutional taking has occurred. The
metaphor fails in a takings analysis because it offers no assistance in
determining whether one stick is constitutionally "heavier" than
another, whether the removal of one stick is so destructive to the
bundle that it should be considered a taking of the whole, or whether
each stick should be considered separately for purposes of the Takings
Clause. These considerations are reflected in two different theories-
conceptual severance and utilitarianism.
Epstein furthers the theory of conceptual severance,47 which
essentially means that every iricident of ownership, such as the right
to use, enjoy or dispose of property, etc., may be severed from the
bundle and considered a property right in itself.4 8 He embraces the
classic liberal conception of property, viewing the three predominant
sticks in the bundle to be the exclusive rights to possession, use, and
disposition.49  Epstein contends that any government action that
interferes with the three exclusive property rights is a prima facie
taking that requires compensation." Thus, for example, any
government action that limits the right to freely dispose of property
would be considered an unconstitutional taking of that property right
(i.e. the right of disposition). To Epstein, the definition of property is
limited to the specific portion or use of property of which the
government deprives the owner.5' Thus, in essence, the property is
defined by what the government has taken. Epstein's view is extreme
45. John Lewis, Law of Eminent Domain in the United States § 55 at 43 (1888)
("The dullest individual among the people knows and understands that his property
in anything is a bundle of rights.").
46. Id. at 44.
47. Professor Radin, professor of law at the University of Southern California
Law Center, coined the term "conceptual severance" after reading Epstein's book,
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain. See Tedrowe, supra
note 44.
48. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain 57-62, 57-58 (1985).
49. Id. at 59.
50. Id. at 57.
51. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception ofProperty: Cross Currents
in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1669 (1988).
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and impractical. Under his theory, all forms of taxation, welfare
contributions and zoning restrictions would be considered
unconstitutional takings.52 Epstein urges that compensation by the
government to all who are adversely affected maximizes efficiency.53
However, Epstein's logic is difficult to follow. Efficiency is
abandoned if government may not reallocate resources to maximize
value without paying every step of the way.54 Conceptual severance,
at best, thwarts efficiency in the name of an extremely conservative
pro-property rationale.
Michelman's view of property, on the other hand, is associated
with utilitarianism. For utilitarians, the ultimate goal is the
maximization of utility for society as a whole, rather than for
individuals.55 According to Michelman, the proper inquiry is whether
it is fair to reallocate an individual's resources in the name of
government action aimed at benefitting society as a whole without
granting a claim to compensation for the private loss inflicted.56
Michelman notes that the common denominator among all Takings
Clause cases is a four factor inquiry: 1) whether the public or its agents
have physically occupied the claimant's property; 2) the degree of the
harm or extent to which the property has been devalued; 3) whether
the loss is outweighed by the public's gain; and 4) any other loss
sustained by the claimant other than the ability to participate in an
unlawful or otherwise harmful activity.5 7 Although these factors are
instrumental in determining whether compensation is needed,
Michelman concedes that the dynamic nature of property precludes
one factor from being dispositive.58 Thus, the overarching theme of
Michelman's view is clear: each factor must be carefully considered
before deeming a taking unconstitutional.
B. Supreme Court Application
The Supreme Court has never fully accepted the Epstein view in
its constitutional analysis of takings under the Fifth Amendment. 9
Instead, Michelman's theory has had greater influence over the Court,
and this is illustrated by the prevailing use of a multi-factor balancing
52. Id.
53. Tedrowe, supra note 44.
54. See supra text accompanying note 9.
55. D. Benjamin Barros, Defining "Property" in the Just Compensation
Clause, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1853, 1859 (1995).
56. Michelman, supra note 8, at 1171-72.
57. Id. at 1184.
58. Id.
59. See Radin, supra note 51, at 1671.
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test as seen in Penn Central.6' However, there are decisions that
indicate the conceptual severance theory still looms in the shadows.6'
The following cases shed light on the Court's development of
regulatory takings through the years. Though IOLTA is not a
regulatory taking, regulatory takings cases are relevant. In fact, the
Court relied on regulatory takings cases in its first confrontation with
IOLTA in Phillips.62 A thorough examination of the cases reveals that
the only logical solution to analyzing intangible property takings cases
is to consider all the pertinent facts of a particular situation by
applying the Penn Central balancing test.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York63 provides
the prevailing standards for a constitutional regulatory takings
analysis. Penn Central assigns a practical application to the analysis
first stated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,' where the Supreme
Court, led by Justice Holmes, stated that a regulation that goes too far
will be considered a taking.65  Penn Central provides what
Pennsylvania Coal was lacking: the mechanism for determining how
far is too far.
At issue in Penn Central was the constitutionality of New York
City's Landmarks Preservation Law, which prohibited Penn Central
Transportation Co., owners of the Grand Central Terminal
("Terminal"), from building a multi-story office building above the
Terminal in the name of preserving a historical landmark.66 Penn
Central Transportation Company argued that the regulation effected a
taking, and thus required compensation. Before refuting these claims,
the Supreme Court noted its inability to settle on a simple formula and
stressed the importance of relying on the particular circumstances of
the case. 67 The Court set forth the relevant factors to be considered in
a takings analysis, otherwise known as the Penn Central multi-factor
balancing test. These considerations are: "[t]he economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations
.... ,68 With the aid of these factors, the Court held that the
60. 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (1978).
61. See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112
S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
62. 524U.S. 156, 118S.Ct. 1925.
63. 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646.
64. 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158 (1922) (deeming unconstitutional a
Pennsylvania statute that forbade the Pennsylvania Coal Co. from mining coal
beneath homes).
65. Id. at414-15.
66. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 117-18, 98 S.Ct. at 2655-56.
67. Id. at 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659 (citing United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168, 78 S.Ct. 1097, 1104 (1958)).
68. Id.
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Landmarks Law did not effect a taking because the regulation not only
promoted the general welfare, but also afforded appellants alternatives
for enhancing the Terminal site and surrounding properties.69 Finally,
the Court explicitly disavowed any support for a conceptual severance
argument in stating that the property should be considered as a whole,
and not as inconspicuous pieces.7" Thus, whether there was a
regulatory taking depended on the character and extent of the
interference with respect to the entire city block because the entire
block was considered the "landmark site.'
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,72 Justice Scalia broke
new ground and introduced aper se rule for regulatory takings similar
to the rule applied to physical takings.73 In Lucas, the Court held that
South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act, which prohibited the
plaintiff, Lucas, from building homes on his residential lots, was an
unconstitutional taking under thisperse analysis. According to Scalia,
this per se category would require compensation for any government
action resulting in a complete deprivation of all feasible use of a
claimant's property, thus making it analogous to a physical
appropriation.74 This decision was expansive in that it seemingly
placed regulatory takings on equal footing with physical invasions of
property, the latter of which having long been considered especially
egregious. 75 However, Scalia limited his reasoning to situations where
there is a complete taking of all economically beneficial uses of the
property.76 In Lucas, Scalia asserted that Lucas had been deprived of
all economic value of his property because Lucas purchased the lots
for the sole reason of building homes thereon, a use prohibited by the
69. Id. at 138, 98 S.Ct. at 2666.
70. Id., 438 U.S. at 130-31,98 S.Ct. at2662 ("'Taking'jurisprudence does not
divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both
on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with
rights in the parcel as a whole - here, the city tax block designated as the
'landmark site.').
71. Id.
72. 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886.
73. Id. at 1019, 112 S.Ct. at 2895 (Scalia reasoned, "[T]here are good reasons
for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common
good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.").
74. Id. at 1030, 112 S.Ct. at 2901.
75. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659 ("A 'taking' may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government, than when the interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.") (citations omitted).
76. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030, 112 S.Ct. at 2901.
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Beachfront Management Act." Thus, the Court held that
compensation was required.
Though it was never actually termed as such, the theory of
conceptual severance was looming in the shadows of Lucas because,
in order to find that the regulation effected a total taking, Scalia had to
sever the use right the Act prohibited (i.e., development of the
beachfront property) from the rest of the property.7 - As Justices
Kennedy and Blackmun pointed out in their concurring and dissenting
opinions, there are other economic uses available to owners of
beachfront property.79 By ignoring these other economic uses
available to Lucas, Scalia, in effect, limited the property at issue to the
incident of property that was affected by the regulation, rather than
considering the property as a whole. This argument is indeed
conceptual severance.
Lucas has not been overturned, but subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have either ignored or distinguished Lucas, revealing the
Court's disfavor with applying Scalia'sper se theory.8" Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,"'
decided in 2002, is the latest Supreme Court holding on regulatory
takings. Tahoe does not overrule Lucas, but it clearly illustrates the
Court's disavowal of aper se analysis for regulatory takings in favor
of Penn Central ad hoc factual inquiries.8 2 The facts of Tahoe are
similar to those in Lucas. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA) imposed two moratoria prohibiting development of the land
surrounding Lake Tahoe. 3 A group of real estate owners challenged
the constitutionality of the regulation, alleging it effected a taking of
77. Id. at 1018, 112 S.Ct. at 2895.
78. See Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 331, 122 S.Ct. at 1483 (alluding to the conceptual
severance argument in Lucas in stating, "Petitioners' 'conceptual severance'
argument is unavailing because it ignores Penn Central's admonition that in
regulatory takings cases we must focus on 'the parcel as a whole.").
79. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044, 112 S.Ct. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("State courts frequently have recognized that land has economic value where the
only residual economic uses are recreation or camping.").
80. See Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 332, 122 S.Ct. at 1484 ("[T]he categorical rule in
Lucas was carved out for the 'extraordinary case' in which a regulation permanently
deprives property of all value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory taking
context, we require a more fact specific inquiry."); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 636, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 2467 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (resisting
"[t]he temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction.").
81. 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465.
82. Id. at 321, 122 S.Ct. at 1478 ("[O]ur cases do not support [the petitioners]
proposed categorical rule - indeed, fairly read, they implicitly reject it. [T]he
answer to the abstract question whether a temporary moratorium effects a taking is
neither 'yes, always' nor 'no, never'; the answer depends upon the particular
circumstances of the case.").
83. Id. at 306, 122 S.Ct. at 1470.
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private property without compensation." The Court rejected the
petitioners' contention that, under Lucasper se rule, they were entitled to
compensation because they were deprived of all economically viable use
of their property.85 Justice Stevens, speaking for the Court, asserted that
when confronted with regulatory takings cases, the Supreme Court had
abrogated the use of a categorical rule in favor of an analysis assessing all
pertinent facts.86 The Court reconciled its decision with Lucas by arguing
that, unlike in Lucas where the regulation precluded all economically
feasible use of the 'property, the regulation at issue only placed a
temporary halt on such use.87 Thus, according to the Court, anything less
than a complete or total loss of all economic use would require a Penn
Central multi-factor analysis.
88
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented and
suggested support for the theory of conceptual severance. They treated
the property owners' economic interests as separate and apart from all
other ownership interests in the land surrounding Lake Tahoe. Rehnquist
held fast to Lucas, arguing that the regulation deprived the property owner
of all economically beneficial use of his land so as to constitute a taking.89
Thomas and Scalia dissented separately and expressed their disapproval
of considering the property as a whole. They argued that a regulation
depriving the owner of even a "temporal slice" of the use of his property
is a taking for which the owner must be compensated unless state property
law would have precluded this use anyway.' Though they only comprise
a minority of the Court, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas will likely
continue to apply conceptual severance to require compensation for
interference with any property right incident to ownership.91 Thus,
conceptual severance lives on, and could again rear its ugly head in the
upcoming constitutional challenge against IOLTA in Washington Legal
Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington.
IV. THE UPCOMING DECISION OF LEGAL FOUNDATION V. LEGAL
FOUNDATION OF WASHINGTON
A. Is the Interest Property?
1. Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation
Washington Legal Foundation, a Texas attorney and a Texas
citizen brought an action against the justices of the Texas Supreme
84. Id.
85. Id. at330-31, 122 S.Ct. at 1483.
86. Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 321, 122 S.Ct. at 1478.
87. Id. at 332, 122 S.Ct. at 1484.
88. Id. at 330, 122 S.Ct. at 1483.
89. Id. at 346, 122 S.Ct. at 1491-92.
90. Id. at 355, 122 S.Ct. at 1496 (citations omitted).
91. See discussion supra Part III, § A(1).
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Court, the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, and the
Foundation's chairman, arguing that the Texas IOLTA program was
an unconstitutional taking of private property. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary
judgment for the defendants and held that the interest in IOLTA was
not "property."92 The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed.93 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
held the interest income generated by funds held in IOLTA was the
private property of the owner of the principal for purposes of the
Takings Clause.94 The Phillips holding was limited to the property
question, and did not address whether the IOLTA program effected
an unconstitutional taking of private property without just
compensation.
In determining that the interest earned on a client's principal (i.e.
the initial sum placed in trust) is his property, the Court followed the
same property law principles as it had in Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth.95 In Roth, the Court stated that the Constitution
does not create property rights.96 Instead, the dimensions of property
interest are defined by existing rules from independent sources such
as state law.97 Thus, in deciding how to classify the interest accruals
from principal amounts placed in trust accounts pursuant to IOLTA,
the Phillips Court deferred to the age old common law principle that
"interest follows principal." 98 The court was unconcerned that
affected clients would realize no net interest, reasoning that property
does not cease to be property because it lacks a positive economic
value.99
92. Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice, 873 F. Supp.
1.
93. Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d
996.
94. Phillips, 524 U.S. 156, 118 S.Ct. 1925.
95. 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972).
96. Id. ("Property interests ... are not created by the Constitution. [T]hey are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law. . .
'97. Id.
98. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 165, 118 S.Ct. at 1930 (citing Beckford v. Tobin, 1
Ves.Sen. 308,310,27 Eng.Rep. 1049, 1051 (Ch. 1749)) ("[Interest shall follow the
principal, as the shadow the body."). The Court also noted that Texas law supports
the interest follows principal rationale. See Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S.W.2d
242, 243 (Tex. 1972).
99. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 169-70, 118 S.Ct. at 1933 (citing Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 6164 (1982); States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,378, 65 S.Ct. 357, 359 (1945)) ("We have
never held that a physical item is not 'property' simply because it lacks a positive
economic or market value. [P]roperty is more than economic value... ; it also
consists of 'the group of rights which the so-called owner exercises in his dominion
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The Court analogized Phillips to Webb 's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith. ' There, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of a Florida statute that deemed all interest
generated from funds deposited in the court registry to be income of
the clerk of court's office.'0 ' In Webb 's, the appellant placed nearly
two million dollars into the court's registry for an interpleader
action.' O2 The controversy arose when the clerk of court deducted
over nine thousand dollars from the fund as a fee for services, in
addition to retaining over one hundred thousand dollars in interest
that had accrued from the appellant's principal.'13 In Webb's, the
Court relied on the "interest follows principal" theory and held that
the Florida statute violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause,
noting that the owners had a reasonable and substantial expectation
that the principal would earn net interest) °4
The petitioners in Phillips urged that Webb's was not definitive,
citing circumstances in Texas where the interest does not always
follow the principal.'0 ° Alternatively, the United States as amicus
curiae noted that but for legislation authorizing NOW accounts, no
interest would accrue for the client, and that, therefore, the interest
was not the client's property but rather a gratuitously conferred
benefit.0 6 Lastly, the petitioners argued there could be no property
interest because, with or without IOLTA, the clients had no
expectation of income from the principal.'0 7 The Court quickly
dismissed these arguments, noting that the common law exceptions
to the "interest follows principal" rule did not apply.'0° The Court
did recognize that a state may not simply circumvent through
legislation the traditional rule that interest follows principal.' ° The
earnings of the principal are property, just as the principal is
of the physical thing,' such 'as the right to possess, use and dispose of it."').
100. 449 U.S. 155, 101 S.Ct. 446 (1980).
101. Id., 449 U.S. at 156, 101 S.Ct. at 448 n.1.
102. Id. at 156, 101 S.Ct. at 448.
103. Id. at 158, 101 S.Ct. at 449.
104. Id. at 161, 101 S.Ct. at 451.
105. Brief for Petitioners at 22, Phillips, 524 U.S. 156, 118 S.Ct. 1925 (No.
96-1578) (citing situations in which the interest does not follow the principal in
Texas, such as "income-only" trusts where one beneficiary receives the principal
and another receives the interest, as well as community property law that requires
the interest earned on the principal to be owned jointly by the spouses rather than
solely by the depositor).
106. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Phillips, 524 U.S. 156, 118
S.Ct. 1925 (No. 96-1578).
107. Brief for Petitioners at 27-8, Phillips, 524 U.S. 156, 118 S.Ct. 1925 (No.
96-1578).
108. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 168, 118 S.Ct. at 1932.
109. Id. at 167, 118 S.Ct. at 1931 (citing Webb's, 449.U.S. at 164, 101 S.Ct. at
452).
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property. Thus, the court deemed the interest earned on monies
placed in IOLTA to be property."°
2. Phillips: A Decision, but not an Answer
The major flaw of Phillips is that the Court considered the property
question without also considering the interconnected taking and
compensation issues. Thus, although the Supreme Court rendered a
decision in Phillips, it resolved little because the constitutionality of
IOLTA stills hangs in the balance. Phillips left us with nothing but a
wasted trip to Capitol Hill and a stack of unfinished business that
Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington
must now resolve. Perhaps the Court was just biding its time until it
was ready to make the right decision. Fortunately, the Phillips Court
resolved the property issue when it recognized a property interest in
the monies placed in NOW accounts. Thus, the only remaining issue
for the Court to address in Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal
Foundation of Washington will be whether the property has been taken
without just compensation.
B. The interest is property, but is IOLTA an unconstitutional taking?
Regulatory takings have traditionally involved governmental
regulations that place limitations upon property rights incidental to the
property, e.g., disposition rights, use rights, exclusionary rights, etc.'11
IOLTA, however, is not a regulatory taking because, rather than
placing limitations on incidental property rights, IOLTA actually
appropriates the property itself. Though this would appear to be a
physical taking, the Supreme Court has noted that, due to its fungible
nature, money cannot be physically appropriated as can real or
personal property. 2 The Supreme Court has already analyzed IOLTA
in the context of a regulatory takings analysis, which suggests that the
Court will likely look to a regulatory takings analysis in deciding
Washington Legal Foundation.
The nature of the property interest involved in Washington Legal
Foundation makes it unreasonable to analogize it to real property. The
transfer of interest to IOLTA does not affect the property owner in the
same way that a physical invasion of one's property would. This
110. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 172, 118 S.Ct. at 1934.
111. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309
(1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141
(1987); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646.
112. See United States v. Sperry, 493 U.S. 52,62 n. 9, 110 S.Ct. 387 (1989); but
see Washington, 271 F.3d 835, 866 (J., Kozinki, dissenting).
113. 524 U.S. 156,118 S.Ct. 1925.
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becomes clear when the nature of interest in IOLTA is contrasted with
the nature of real property. Interest payments are highly regulated as a
matter of course, and thus create an expectation of regulation by the
government or financial institution. "4 On the other hand, one would not
expect the government to take physical property, like a portion of one's
home or driveway, without paying for it. Thus, although IOLTA is not
a regulatory taking, due to the nature of the property at stake, a
regulatory takings analysis is entirely appropriate.
The trend toward conducting the ad hoc factual inquiries of Penn
Central to analyze regulatory takings is apparent in the Supreme Court's
Takings Clause jurisprudence. After analyzing years of constitutional
takings cases it is apparent that it is the most appropriate method for
regulatory takings cases. Granted, Justice Scalia persuaded a majority
of the Court, in Lucas, to equate a regulatory taking to a physical taking
when government action results in a complete loss of all property
value.' However, the Court has shied away from applying the Lucas
rule. The Court has exercised this restraint because regulatory takings
are simply not as egregious as physical takings of real property, a fact
even the Lucas Court conceded.' 6 Thus, as became clear in Tahoe,
although the Court has not overruled Lucas, it has explicitly disavowed
any regulatory takings analysis other than Penn Central ad hoc
analysis."7
An ad hoc analysis, in the case of IOLTA, would allow for a
consideration of all the relevant facts, thereby assuring that not one
factor or stick, if you will, is dispositive in determining whether
compensation i§ required. Applying the Lucas categorical rule would be
illogical and arbitrary because it would improperly augment the client's
rights at the expense of the government. In other words, applying the
per se rule would create too much property."' Perhaps it is for this
reason that the Court has been reluctant to apply a per se analysis to any
government actions but actual physical takings of real property. "9
Choosing the ad hoc analysis over theper se analysis might appear
to some members of the Court to be an arbitrary decision, but Justice
114. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66, 100 S.Ct. 318, 327 (1979) ("[T]he
interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than
other property related interests.").
115. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886.
116. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028, 112 S.Ct. at 2900 ("Where 'permanent physical
occupation' of land is concerned we have refused to allow the government to decree
it anew (without compensation), no matter how weighty the asserted 'public
interests' involved...") (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 426, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3171); see supra text accompanying note 87.
117. See supra text accompanying note 85.
118. Id. at 1479 ("Treating them all as per se takings would transform
government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford.").
119. Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 326-27, 122 S.Ct at 1481.
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Kennedy, for one, would likely agree that such a choice would be no
more arbitrary than the one the Court made in Lucas. Justice Kennedy
expressed these sentiments most accurately in voicing disapproval of
the categorical rule in Lucas: "The Court seems to treat history as a
grab bag of principles, to be adopted where they support the Court's
theory, and ignored where they do not.' 20 Kennedy's disapproval
must be taken with a grain of salt, however, because even if the Court
resurrects the conceptual severance theory of Lucas, it would not have
much bite in the case of Washington Legal Foundation. IOLTA does
not deprive the owner of all economic use of the property (i.e. the
interest plus the principal). The client does not lose any ability to use,
enjoy, or dispose of the principal. Nevertheless, however proper the
result might be were the Court to take such an approach, the proper
test to apply to IOLTA is the Penn Central ad hoc analysis.
Conceptual severance is a slippery slope, even more dangerous
than the Court's analysis in Lucas, which the Court has continued to
distinguish away.2 Since Lucas, the Court has backed away from
applying the perse analysis to regulatory takings, presumably because
it was just too expansive. The Court just is not ready to subject
regulatory takings to the level of scrutiny applied to physical
takings.' Thus, the Court has whittled the holding of Lucas to
practically nothing. Lucas only applies in the most extreme cases (i.e.
where the regulation strips the property of all of its beneficial uses). 23
Similarly, conceptual severance would require the government to pay
for every interference with any stick in the bundle of rights, not only
affecting IOLTA, but also countless other government programs,
incentives, and/or regulations. According to Epstein, even taxation is
an unconstitutional taking. 24 Conceptual severance would reflect a
sweeping and disconcerting change in the Court's view of the Fifth
Amendment and its purposes of efficiency and justice.
Undoubtedly, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas will urge
the conceptual severance argument upon the Court. However, even
though conceptual severance is easy to visualize, this does not make
it logical. One can only find solace in the prospect that at least five
justices will recognize the dangerously expansive nature of conceptual
severance, and the far-reaching repercussions it promises for IOLTA
and all other such government programs in disavowing its application
in Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington.
Washington LegalFoundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington
places before the Court a program that requires interest from the
120. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1060, 112 S.Ct. at 2917.
121. See supra note 80.
122. See supra text accompanying note 75.
123. See supra note 80.
124. See discussion supra Part III, § A(1).
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client's principal to be transferred to a program that helps provide
legal services to the poor. The Court must follow the guidelines set
forth by Michelman as well as those set forth by the Court in Penn
Central. These guidelines suggest a number of factors should be
considered: the size of the claimant's harm or the degree to which the
property has been devalued the action's effects on the owner's distinct
economic expectations,12? and whether the claimant's loss is
outweighed by the public gain. 2 6 Considering each of these factors,
and taking the property as whole, 27 IOLTA programs simply cannot
be deemed a taking that requires compensation.
First, the client suffers absolutely no economic loss under IOLTA.
By definition, the only monies allowed to be deposited in IOLTA are
those the attorney determines would not even earn a net interest.
IOLTA is essentially appropriating interest from the bank, because the
client would never realize any net interest. In essence, this is property
the client would never see. All IOLTA does is pool this interest into
a trust account where it can actually produce an economic benefit for
society as a whole, rather than a windfall for the bank. Furthermore,
the only reason the principal may accrue interest at all is due to the
establishment of NOW accounts. NOW accounts allow interest to be
earned on demand deposits only if the interest accruals are transferred
to charitable institutions.2 8 Thus, with or without IOLTA, the client
would not receive a net interest payment and, therefore, the factor
concerning the size of the harm weighs heavily in favor of IOLTA
because the harm is absolutely nonexistent.
Second, IOLTA in no way affects the investment-backed
expectations of the client because it does not decrease the value of the
principal value in anyway. The interest is a mere portion of the whole
- namely the interest plus the principal. The interest is affected, but
it does not disadvantage the client because IOLTA takes something the
client would never be able to use, enjoy, or dispose of in the first
place. One cannot reasonably have investment-backed expectations
in interest payments to which he was never entitled. If the client is
clearly not due an interest payment in any event, it is inconceivable
that the client could have any legitimate expectations of entitlement to
the property. The client's expectation of earning a net interest is
nothing more than an abstract need, the denial of which cannot justify
compensation." 9 Further, the principal amount placed in trust by the
125. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659.
126. Michelman, supra note 8 at 1173.
127. Considering the property as a whole is what the United States Supreme
Court has explicitly stated we should do in past cases. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S.
104, 98 S.Ct. 2646; Tahoe, 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465.
128. See supra text accompanying note 3.
129. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 160, 101 S.Ct. at 451.
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client is unaffected, thus allowing any investment-backed
expectations in the principal to be fulfilled. Because IOLTA does not
adversely affect the client's legitimate investment-backed
expectations, this factor, too, must fail.
Finally, IOLTA is a program that generates over one hundred
million dollars each year to fund socially beneficial services
necessary to uphold "equal justice under law"' 3° and the American
democracy we laud. Most significantly, it funds these services from
interest amounts the client would never see anyway. The beauty of
IOLTA is best appreciated after considering the alternatives. Should
the Court shut down IOLTA in Washington Legal Foundation, over
one hundred million dollars in funding will be lost. Due to the
importance the legal profession places on providing legal services to
the underprivileged, someone or something will be forced to pick up
the slack. Voluntary contributions were attempted as a funding
source, and quickly proven ineffective. 3' In fact, the failure to
sustain an adequate funding source prompted the establishment of
IOLTA in the first place. For non-lawyers, a particularly enticing
alternative is assessing attorneys with the costs of providing legal
services to indigents since attorneys insist upon providing the
service. But this result places clients in an even worse position than
IOLTA would. If attorneys' costs increase, so will the cost of
acquiring legal services in general. However, this time the funding
will be pulled directly from the client's pocket, not the bank's. No
matter what the alternative, the client pays. But, with IOLTA, the
client pays with monies he would never receive. Ultimately, the
financial institution is the loser, not the client. Unquestionably, the
benefits of a program that provides millions of dollars for socially
beneficial programs without adversely affecting the client must
outweigh the losses.
All of Michelman and Penn Central's factors weigh in favor of
IOLTA. The client's degree of harm is minimal, if not nonexistent,
because the interest transferred is interest the client would never
receive. The client cannot have legitimate investment-backed
expectations in interest payments to which he is not entitled. Lastly,
the benefits of IOLTA outweigh the losses because IOLTA raises
millions of dollars for programs that benefit the public good by
making an efficient use of otherwise dormant property. Unless
130. In the first day of Constitutional Law II at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center
on the campus of Louisiana State University, my professor and advisor on this case
note, Paul R. Baier, began our class by stating these immortal words, informing the
class that these words are etched into the Supreme Court building. This phrase
served as a jumping off point for the Summer Term of 2002, and has inspired me
in my journey toward an understanding of constitutional law.
131. See supra note 2.
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conceptual severance is foolishly resurrected, IOLTA cannot be
deemed an unconstitutional taking.
However, the Court may decide to use a conceptual severance
analysis to conclude that IOLTA effects a taking. According to
Epstein's theory of conceptual severance, the interest can be severed
from the principal and considered as a property interest in and of
itself.1 32 To him, the property interest at stake would be the interest
alone, and any interference with that property right demands
compensation. 33  Consequently, under a conceptual severance
analysis, the appropriation of interest to IOLTA would result in a
taking of all the property's beneficial uses because the property is the
interest itself. Thus, if conceptual severance is applied, Washington
Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington would come
close to falling within the realm of Lucas because IOLTA appropriates
all of the interests' value. Because interest is calculated separately
from the principal, it is easy to conceptually sever the two.
Should the Court follow the reasoning of Rehnquist and Scalia and
apply a conceptual severance theory to find that there is a taking
requiring just compensation, no compensation is due. A taking due no
just compensation simply cannot be unconstitutional. The Fifth
Amendment does not prohibit all takings, just takings without just
compensation. With or without IOLTA, the client remains in the same
position he was prior to the transfer because, by definition, no funds
are placed into IOLTA unless they cannot earn net interest. Though
the Court has deemed the interest to be property, it does not change the
fact that it is property that would never be reduced to the client's
possession. Further, the purpose ofjust compensation is to place the
property owner in the same position he was in prior to the government
interference.33 Repayment for the interest appropriated to IOLTA,
would place the client in a better position; thus no payment is due.
Just compensation is zero, and if just compensation equates to no
compensation, then there is no unconstitutional taking. To hold
otherwise is a mere inconsequential abstraction.'35
Paying the client the value of his interest would put the client in a
better position than he was in before the alleged taking. Requiring the
government to pay the client the face value of each interest accrual
would not further the compensation requirement of the Takings
Clause. To pay the client the value of the interest would not only be
132. See discussion supra Part III, § A(I).
133. See discussion supra Part III, § A(1).
134. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 748, 117 S.Ct.
1659, 1671 (1997) (citing U.S. v. 564.54 Acres of Monroe and Pike County Land,
441 U.S. 506, 510, 99 S.Ct. 1854, 1856 (1979)) (stating the owner must be put "in
as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken").
135. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 174-75, 118 S.Ct. at 1935 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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costly in terms of allocation, but would also undermine the very
premise upon which IOLTA stands. IOLTA makes beneficial use of
otherwise dormant property, thus increasing its efficiency. Should
IOLTA be required to pay for its use of the interest, the use is no
longer efficient. As Justice Holmes stated in Pennsylvania Coal,
"Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law.' 3
6
V. CONCLUSION
The per se categorical approach is inappropriate for analyzing
IOLTA's constitutionality. Instead, all of the pertinent factors must
be considered. After an ad hoc consideration of all the facts, IOLTA
must be upheld. A public program that utilizes otherwise dormant
interest amounts to benefit the poor at no detriment to the client
cannot be considered an unconstitutional taking. When just
compensation is absolutely zero, there is no unconstitutional taking.
Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of
Washington is a weighty decision. The answer lies in the Supreme
Court's view of constitutional property law. Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia and Thomas will likely urge conceptual severance to strike
down the Washington IOLTA program, and ultimately IOLTA
programs everywhere. Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, who dissented in Phillips and argued that IOLTA would not
effect an unconstitutional taking, will likely declare IOLTA
constitutional in Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation
of Washington. Thus, the deciding votes may lie in the hands of
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who have shown a preference for
ad hoc considerations and considering the property interest as a
whole.
Overwhelming United States Supreme Court jurisprudence
reveals an unwillingness to apply the categorical rule established in
Lucas, culminating most recently in Tahoe. This preference for ad
hoc factual inquiries, and the seeming positions of the justices on the
issue bodes well for IOLTA. The Court is willing to compensate
practically any physical taking no matter how minimal the intrusion,
but it just is not ready to assign the same presumption in favor of
intangible property takings, particularly when the transfer of interest
into IOLTA does not rise to the level of a physical invasion due to
the nature of the property itself. Applying the factors set forth in
Penn Central, IOLTA simply cannot be considered an
136. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393,413, 43 S.Ct. 158, 159.
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unconstitutional taking. Whether the Court will follow these
suggestions is anyone's guess. But, if efficiency and justice prevail,
IOLTA will live to fight another day.
Tara E. Montgomery*
** The author dedicates this casenote to the late Senator A. Harold
Montgomery, who would have beamed at the sight of his granddaughter's name in
print. Also, the author extends her thanks to Professor Paul M. Baier for not only
suggesting the topic, but also for advising the author during the writing process.
Finally, the author thanks her family and friends for their constant encouragement
and support throughout her law school career.
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